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Abstract— This paper describes a new model for sharing 
location info for mobile users. This approach can operate 
without the need for disclosing identity info to third party 
servers. It could be described as a safe location sharing model. 
The proposed approach creates a special form of distributed 
database that splits location info and identity information. In 
this distributed data store identity info is always saved locally.  
It eliminates one of the main concerns with location-based 
systems – privacy. This paper describes a model itself as well as 
its implementation in the form of HTML5 mobile web 
application.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
 
It is a well-known fact that the question “where are you” 
is one of the most often asked during the communications. 
600 billion text messages per year in the US ask, "Where are 
you?"  (it is per Location Business Summit 2010 data [1]). A 
huge amount of mobile services is actually being built 
around this question so their main feature is user’s location 
exchange.  
Location, while being only one of the possible sensor 
readings of a modern smart phone, is probably the first 
attribute (candidate) to share for mobile users.  Location 
information plays the major role in all context-aware 
applications [2]. The typical applications are well known and 
include for example geo-tagged context, friend-finder, 
recommendation systems, turn-by-turn navigation, etc. 
In location-based service (LBS) scenarios we can 
describe the following actors [3]:  
- Intended recipient, e.g., the service company, friends, 
parents, etc. This usually involves the use of a service 
provider that offers to forward your location to the intended 
recipient. 
- Service provider, e.g., Google providing you with the 
Latitude application, or a restaurant recommendation system 
for near-by places. In contrast to the intended recipient, users 
usually do not have a primary goal of letting the service 
provider know their location – it is a by-product of getting a 
restaurant review or staying in touch with friends. 
- Infrastructure provider, e.g., your mobile operator. 
While self-positioning systems such as GPS can work 
without an infrastructure provider, mobile phone users are 
often implicitly located in order to provide communication 
services (for example, route phone calls). 
Some papers mentioned also so-called unintended 
recipients [3]. For example, we can mention accidental 
recipient, illegal recipient and law enforcement. 
Interesting also, that in the most cases talking about LBS 
we assume that for a given system, the infrastructure 
provider needs to be trusted. In other words the need for 
sharing location data with infrastructure providers is non-
discussable.  
In the most cases location sharing is implemented as the 
ability for the mobile user (mobile phone owner) write down 
own location info in the some special place (special mobile 
application). 
But it means of course, that user must be registered in 
this service (download some special application). And even 
more important – everyone who needs this information must 
use the same service too [1]. 
One of the biggest concerns for all location-based 
services is user’s privacy. Despite the increased availability 
of these location-sharing applications, we have not yet seen 
wide adoption. It has been suggested that the reason for this 
lack of adoption may be users’ privacy concerns regarding 
the sharing and use of their location information. 
For example, the widely cited review of social networks 
practices [4] concluded that location information is 
preferably shared on a need to know basis, not broadcast.  As 
it is mentioned in [5], current location sharing tools often 
present over-simplistic privacy settings by which users are 
forced to the binary alternative of sharing everything or 
nothing. Author suggests a special privacy-by-design 
approach to location sharing.  This has led to the 
development of methods enhancing location privacy, and to 
the investigation of reasons for sharing location information. 
In the same time, some authors [6] explores human strategies  
and show that human strategies for de-anonymization and re-
identification can be highly successful and thus pose a threat 
to location privacy comparable to computational attacks. 
In the most location sharing surveys, participants were 
biased against sharing their location constantly, without 
explicit consent each time their location is requested. This 
suggests that people are cautious about sharing their location 
and need to be reassured that their private information is only 
being disclosed when necessary and is not readily available 
to everybody. 
The key point for any existing service is some third party 
server that keeps identities and locations. We can vary the 
approaches for sharing (identity, locations) pairs but we 
could not remove the main part in privacy concerns – the 
third part server itself.  
As mentioned in [7] peer opinion and technical 
achievements contribute most to whether or not participants 
thought they would continue to use a mobile location 
technology. 
One possible solution is using peer-to-peer location 
sharing.  The easiest way to apparently “solve” location 
privacy problems is to manually or automatically authorize 
(or not) the disclosure of location information to others. But 
we should see in the same time the other privacy issue that is 
not eliminated. Your location will be disclosed to (saved on) 
some third party server.  For example, you can share location 
info in Google Latitude on “per friend” mode, but there is 
still some third party server (Google) that keeps your 
location and your identity  
Typically we have now two models for location sharing 
in services. At the first hand is some formation of passive 
location monitoring and future access to the accumulated 
data trough some API. It is Google Latitude for example. 
Possible problems are privacy - some third party tool is 
constantly monitoring my location and what is more 
important – saves it on the some external server as well as 
the shorted life for handset’s batteries. 
Another model for location sharing is check-in. It could 
be an active (e.g. Foursquare), when user directly sets his/her 
current location or passive (e.g. Twitter) when location info 
could be added to the current message. A check-in is a 
simple way to keep tabs on where you’ve been, broadcast to 
your friends where you are, and discover more about other 
people in your community. But here we can see not only 
privacy issue - all my friends/followers can see my location 
but also a noise related issue – my location info could be 
actually interested only for the physical friends. For the 
majority of followers my location info (e.g. status from 
Foursquare in Twitter’s time line) is just a noise [1] 
Lets us describe some existing approaches in LBS 
development that targets the privacy. 
One of the most popular methods for location privacy is 
obfuscation [8]. Obfuscating location information lowers its 
precision, e.g., showing only street or city level location 
instead of the actual coordinates, so that the visible (within 
our system) location does not correspond to the real one. For 
example, in Google Latitude we can allow some of the users 
get our own location info on the city level only. Sometimes 
even the random noise could be added to the real location 
data [9].  But once again – it is just a visible location. The 
central point (points) for such a system can have all the 
information.  
Some articles prefer the using term spatial cloaking and 
describe it as the most commonly used privacy-enhancing 
technique in LBS. The basic idea of the spatial cloaking 
technique is to blur a user’s exact location into a cloaked 
area that satisfies the user specified privacy requirements 
[10]. 
Another popular approach in the area of location privacy 
is “k-anonymity” [11]. As per this approach the actual 
location is substituted by a region containing at least k − 1 
other users, thus ensuring that a particular request can only 
be attributed to “1 out of k” people. Of course, this approach 
has the disadvantage that if the region contains too few 
people, it has to be enlarged until it contains the right number 
of people. But in general k-anonymity protects identity 
information in a location-oriented context. In the same time, 
the group-composing algorithm is complex and the member 
peers are dynamic. The big question again is it core-level 
protection or just a view. In other words what kind of data do 
have inside of our system – anonymous location info right 
from the moment data being put into our system or it is just a 
view and data internally saved in raw formats. 
Of course, the deployment of location privacy methods 
depends on the tasks our system is going to target.  For 
example, obfuscating location information in case of 
emergency help system could not be a good idea. But from 
other side many geo-context aware applications (e.g. geo 
search) can use approximate location info. 
Also we need to highlight the role of identity in LBS. It 
looks like combining identity with location info is just an 
attempt for delivering more targeted advertising rather then 
the need of the services themselves. It is obviously for 
example, that local search for some points of interests (e.g., 
café) should work for the anonymous users too. 
Our idea of the signed geo messages service (geo mail, 
geo SMS) based on the adding user’s location info to the 
standard messages like SMS or email. Just as a signature. So 
with this service for telling somebody ‘where I am’ it would 
be just enough to send him/her a message. And your partner 
does not need to use any additional service in order to get 
information about your location. All the needed information 
will be simply delivered to him as a part of the incoming 
message.  
It is obviously peer-to-peer sharing and does not require 
any social network. And it does not require one central point 
for sharing location with by the way. Our location signature 
has got a form of the map with the marker at the shared 
location. And what is important here – the map itself has no 
information about the sender and recipient. That information 
exists only in the message itself. The map (marker) has no 
information about the creator for example. That is all about 
privacy [1]. 
More traditionally, peer-to-peer LBS refer to the way 
sharing information is traversed over the network [12].  For 
example, the P2P k-anonymity algorithm has several steps: 
select a central peer who will act as an agent for the group, 
next, the central peer will discover other k-1 different peers 
via single-hop or multi-hop to compose the group and finally 
find a cloaked region covering all locations that every peer 
may arrive.  
In our article we are using “peer-to-peer” term at the first 
hand for highlighting the target party for the location- 
sharing request. It is “another peer” directly, rather than the 
central server (data store). 
In terms of patterns for LBS this approach targets at the 
first hand such tasks as ‘Friend finder’ and the similar. In 
other words it is anything that could be linked to location 
monitoring.  
The biggest danger of such systems is the recording of 
location information by service providers. Because every 
time a location update is shared, the service provider gets an 
update and is thus able to create detailed behavioral profiles 
of its customers (Google Latitude). As it is mentioned 
before, an ideal privacy-aware location sharing system 
should be able to share location information even without a 
central service provider receiving a copy of the entire 
movement track. It is exactly what Geo Message does. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Geo Signed Mail 
Geo Messages approach works and really eliminates 
identity revealing problems but it is pure peer-to-peer. What 
can we do if we need to monitor several participants 
simultaneously? It is simply not very convenient to jump 
from one message to another. Here we can offer a new peer-
to-peer service that solves the privacy issues and lets you 
deal with several location feeds (location peers) 
simultaneously. 
II. OUR MODEL 
What if we separate (split) the locations and identity? In 
other words rather than use one server that keeps all our data 
we will switch to some distributed architecture.  
WATN (Where Are They Now) [13] requires no sign-in. 
It combines anonymous server-side data with local 
personalized records. 
 
We can separate location info and identity data just in 
three steps: 
a) assign to any participant some unique ID (just an ID, 
without any links to the personality) 
b) save location data on the server with links to the 
above-mentioned IDs 
c) keep the legend (descriptions for IDs, who is behind 
that ID) locally 
 
In this case any participant may request location data for 
other participants from third party server (as per sharing 
rules, of course), get data with IDs and replace IDs (locally) 
with legend’s data. With such replacement we can show 
location data in the "natural" form. For example: name (nick) 
plus location. And in the same time the server (third party 
server for our users) is not aware about names. 
 
What does it mean technically? 
 
Server keeps two things.  
 
a) location info with meaningless IDs: 
 
ID1 -> (latitude, longitude) 
ID2 -> (latitude, longitude) 
ID3 -> (latitude, longitude) 
Etc. 
 
It is just a set of current geo-coordinates for users. Each 
user is presented via own ID. 
 
and  
 
b) social graph info – who is sharing location to whom. 
For example: 
 
ID1-> (ID2, ID3) 
ID3 -> (ID1) 
Etc. 
 
Just a set of records states (as in example above) that user 
marked as ID1 shares location data with users ID2 and ID3 
 
In the same time any local client keeps the own legend: 
 
ID1 -> (name or nick) 
ID2-> (name or nick) 
Etc. 
 
Note, that in this approach each client keeps own legend 
info. And because our clients are not aware about each other 
and there are no third party servers that know all registered 
clients. It means, obviously, that in this model the same ID 
may have different legends. Each client technically can 
assign own name (nick) for the same ID. Our social graph 
saves information (links between participants) using our 
meaningless IDs only. And the human readable 
interpretation for that graph can vary of course from client to 
client.  
But that is probably very close to the real life, where the 
same person could be known under different names (nicks) 
in different contexts (e.g. compare some work environment 
and family space). 
In general it is like keeping social graph, location and 
identity info in distributed database. But it is distributed on 
the server-client level, rather than on the traditional server-
server level. 
 
On practice, the structure could be a bit more elaborated. 
For example, in the current implementation we are saving 
the history - historical set of (latitude, longitude) pairs, we 
can keep some text messages associated with the current 
position etc. But it is just a set of features that does not 
changed the main idea – server-side store for anonymous 
location data and distributed client-side store with pseudo-
personal  data. 
III. WATN ALGORITHM 
 
WATN has been implemented as mobile web 
application. HTML5 is significant there. Application uses 
W3C geo location [14] and local storage specification [15]. 
As per W3C documents HTML5 web storage is local data 
storage, web pages can store data within the user's browser.   
Earlier, this was done with cookies. However, Web 
Storage is more secure and faster and our data is not included 
with every server request, but used only when asked for. It is 
also possible to store large amounts of data, without affecting 
the website's performance. The data is stored in key/value 
pairs, and web pages can only access data stored by them. 
 
Storage is defined by the WhatWG Storage Interface as 
this:  
 
interface Storage { 
  readonly attribute unsigned long length; 
  [IndexGetter] DOMString key(in unsigned long index); 
  [NameGetter] DOMString getItem(in DOMString key); 
  [NameSetter] void setItem(in DOMString key, in 
DOMString data); 
  [NameDeleter] void removeItem(in DOMString key); 
  void clear(); 
}; 
 
The DOM Storage mechanism is a means through which 
string key/value pairs can be securely stored and later 
retrieved for use. The goal of this addition is to provide a 
comprehensive means through which interactive applications 
can be built (including advanced abilities, such as being able 
to work "offline" for extended periods of time). 
User agents must have a set of local storage areas, one 
for each origin. User agents should expire data from the local 
storage areas only for security reasons or when requested to 
do so by the user. User agents should always avoid deleting 
data while a script that could access that data is running. 
 
Mozilla-based browsers, Internet Explorer 8+, Safari 4+ 
and Chrome all provide a working implementation of the 
DOM Storage specification. 
We use local storage for saving legends for IDs as well as 
for the saving own ID for the each client. 
As soon as the client calls the application we can restore 
his own ID from local storage (or obtains a new one from the 
server). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  WATN main screen 
 
After that client saves location data on the server (it is 
check-in) and obtains shared location data (by the social 
graph). Server side part returns social graph data with ID’s as 
JSON array. It is some like this: 
 
[ {“id”:ID1, “lat”:lat1, “lng”:lng1}, 
  {“id”:ID2, “lat”:lat2, “lng”:lng2}, 
  … 
] 
 
For our server-side database it is just a plain select (no 
joins) where our own ID is a key. It is very important, 
because complex database queries in geo systems can 
seriously affect the performance. 
 
After that we can simply match that array against the 
local database with identities. Client modifies received data 
and replaces IDs with known names from local database. So, 
after that our client side application is ready to show location 
data with names instead of IDs. 
If our system is unaware about some legend, than of 
course it shows “raw” ID instead of name or nickname. 
We can see (control) who is sharing location with us, as 
well as who can read our location info. 
 
Note that using native JSON parsing and serialization 
methods provided by the browser, we can save the obtained 
data too. And technically it let us use the whole application 
in offline mode, playing with the last known data. 
 
 
 
 Figure 3.  Shared location 
And by the similar manner we can see to whom we share 
our own location info: 
 
 
Figure 4.  Share own location 
 
And of course, we can cancel this link any time.  
 
Where are the above-mentioned names (nicks) for IDs 
come from? WATN uses peer-to-peer sharing. It means that 
any user shares own location to another person directly. 
There are no circles, groups, lists etc. As soon as some user 
is going to show own location info to other person he simply 
sends notification about this to another email address (phone 
number in case of SMS). Actually the location could be 
shared to any person with known email address. 
Such notification contains some text with explanation 
"what is it" and, what is obviously should be the main part of 
this process, a special link to WATN. This link contains an 
ID for the request originating party. 
As soon as this link is fired, WATN application (client) 
becomes aware about two IDs: own ID1 for this client (it is 
restored from the local storage – see description above) and 
ID2 from the "shared with you" link (originated request ID). 
So, if notification is accepted, we can add social graph record 
(on the server) like 
 
ID2 -> ID1 
 
(client with ID2 shares own location info with the client 
with ID1. Or, what is technically equal, client with ID1 
identity may read location info for client with identity ID2) 
But because the notification link comes from some 
message (email or SMS), the receiver is aware about the 
context. Simply, he knows either email header ('From') or 
phone number or name in address book SMS comes from. It 
means, that based on that info, our receiver may assign some 
nick (name) for ID in "shared with you" link. Actually it is a 
part of confirmation: confirm and set some name. And that 
name (nick) we can save locally. So, it is like "two phase 
commit" in databases – save a new social graph record on the 
server and create a new legend (record for identity) locally. 
 
 
Figure 5.  Accept location sharing request 
And as a source for profile images (remember – there is 
no registration and profiles) we can use social networks (e.g. 
Twitter and Facebook). If you set a nick for new share that 
corresponds to Twitter’s (Facebook’s) account, the system 
can attach public photo from the social network. 
Of course, as per above described scheme, the mutual 
location sharing could not be set automatically.  The message 
with location sharing link is email (SMS) delivered outside 
of this application. So the application itself is completely 
unaware who is sending sharing message to whom.  
 
It is obviously also, that in this schema each client has 
got own legends. We can have different names for the same 
ID (each client can technically assign own name) 
 
Additional options include messaging and data clearing. 
As soon as you share your location info, you can leave 
messages attached to your location. WATN users that can 
read your location data will see your messages too. 
 
And any time you can delete ID (as well as erase all the 
associated data) from the system.  Note, that in case of any 
reconnection in the future WATN will assign a new ID for 
the user. There is no way to reuse some times once deployed 
ID. This feature also increases privacy. For the first time this 
model was proposed by D. Namiot and initial (alpha) 
implementation was presented in [16]. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This article describes a new model for sharing location 
info in mobile networks. The proposed service WATN 
targets the privacy concerns for LBS applications users.  It 
eliminates one of the biggest security-related problems in 
LBS applications: the need for third party server that keeps 
the most sensitive data – identities and locations for all users.  
WATN could be described as a safe location sharing.  
Service is implemented as HTML5 mobile web 
application and is compatible with all the modern HTML5 
mobile web browsers (iPhone, Android, Opera, Bada, etc.). 
.  
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